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From Narcissism to Face Work: Two Views
on the Self in Social Interaction1
Anssi Peräkylä
University of Helsinki
Through the analysis of conversational interaction and clinical notes,
this article develops conceptual linkages between the Goffmanian con-
cept of face and the psychoanalytic and psychiatric understandings of
narcissism. Self-cathexis—the investment of libidinal emotion to the
image of self—is a key issue both for Goffman and in psychoanalytic
studies of narcissism. For Goffman, the self and its cathexis are inher-
ently fragile interactional achievements, whereas for psychoanalysts
such as Kernberg and Kohut, they are relatively stable intrapsychic
structures. An application of Goffman’s theory to narcissistic person-
ality disorders suggests that pathological narcissism involves the iso-
lation of the person’s self-image from interactional practices and a
consequent inability to beneﬁt from face work in ordinary social en-
counters. Clinical experience suggests revisions to the theory of face
work: there is a biographical continuity in a person’s experience of face,
and successful participation in face work is made possible by the psy-
chic capacity of playful orientation to one’s own and others’ narcissistic
illusions. Such playful orientation is manifested through the interac-
tional practices of role distancing.
The place of psychological considerations—of individual personality, mo-
tivations, and emotions—in Erving Goffman’s interactional theory remains
unclear and disputed. Goffman himself was ambiguous. In the introduction
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to Interaction Ritual, he pointed out that “the proper study of interaction is
not the individual and his psychology, but rather the syntactical relations
among the acts of different persons” ðGoffman 1967, p. 2Þ. However, he also
maintained that in the study of interaction, amodel of “general properties” of
individual actors is needed. But while “psychology is necessarily involved,”
it is psychology of a particular kind: “one stripped and cramped to suit the
sociological study of conversation, track meets, banquets, jury trials, and
street loitering” ðp. 3; see also, e.g., Goffman 1956, pp. 269–70Þ.
While Goffman was inexplicit about the content and the place of this
“stripped and cramped” psychology, his commentators have seen it in quite
different ways. Thus, Schegloff ð1988Þ criticized Goffman for being analyt-
ically imprisoned by his engagement with the psychology of individual ac-
tors: Goffman’s “perduring entanglement with ‘ritual’ and ‘face’ kept him in
the psychology” ðp. 94Þ. This impeded Goffman from the investigation of
“syntactical relations between acts” in their own right. Lerner ð1996Þ saw
Goffman’s engagement with self and face differently, arguing that an ade-
quate analysis of face ðand, hence, of the psychological aspects of interactionÞ
could be brought about by the very procedure that Schegloff saw as impeded
by Goffman’s engagement with psychology: by examining the syntactic re-
lations between acts. In Lerner’s eyes, the features of individual psychology,
for example, feelings attached to self, are produced through “courses of ac-
tion in interaction.” Lerner investigated a particular course of action, antic-
ipatory completion of a coconversationalist’s utterances, as a means of avoid-
ing disagreement and the problems with face that it entails. The description
of courses of action constitutive of face and self has been extended by May-
nard and Zimmerman ð1984Þ and Heritage and Raymond ð2005Þ.
In this article, I take up the psychology of individual actors in interaction.
I do this by exploring linkages between a Goffmanian analysis of interac-
tion and psychoanalytic psychology—thereby engaging with psychology
more than earlier commentators on Goffman have done. The meeting point
between psychology and the study of interaction is in Goffman’s concept of
face, denoting the positive value of self, which I argue encapsulates some of
the phenomena that in psychoanalytic psychology and contemporary psy-
chiatry are referred to as narcissism. I argue that Goffmanian theorizing
about face can beneﬁt from an engagement with psychoanalytic and psy-
chiatric understandings of narcissism and that psychoanalytic theory re-
garding narcissism can beneﬁt from an engagement with a Goffmanian the-
ory of face.
In the text that follows, three different perspectives on the relationship
between Goffman’s concept of face and a psychoanalytic understanding of
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narcissism are intermingled. In a historical perspective, I suggest that there
is a connection in the emergence of these two lines of research on self that
has so far been neglected. In a contrastive perspective, I highlight the basic
differences regarding the constitution of self between Goffmanian and psy-
choanalytic lines of research. In a constructive perspective, I show ways in
which the two understandings of self can still mutually elaborate each other.
The main import of the article lies in the contrastive and the constructive
perspectives, rather than in the historical one.
While the primary thrust of this article is theoretical, two sorts of empiri-
cal materials are included by way of elaborating and concretizing the theo-
retical argument: a fragment of ordinary conversation and excerpts from
clinical notes stemming from the psychoanalytic treatment of a patient with
fragile self-experience.
The line of research that has emerged from Goffman’s work is vast and
divergent, and that emerging in the psychoanalytic tradition is even more so.
In discussingGoffman,my anchor point ismostly the conversation analytical
lineage arising from his seminal work. In discussing psychoanalytic con-
ceptions of self, I start by engaging with Otto Kernberg’s and especially
Heinz Kohut’s inﬂuential theories of narcissism. When discussing the pos-
sibility of mutual elaboration between Goffman and psychoanalysis, I will
move my anchor point to the more recent tradition of relational psycho-
analysis. Many important psychoanalytic conceptualizations of narcissism,
such as those by Stolorow ð1975Þ, Etchegoyen ð1985Þ, and Green ð2002Þ, go
beyond the scope of this article.
A NEGLECTED CONNECTION
A short passage in Goffman’s famous essay On Face Work ðGoffman ½1955
1967, p. 6Þ catches the eye: “A person tends to experience an immediate
emotional response to the face a contact with others allows him; he cathects
his face; his ‘feelings’ become attached to it.”What Goffman calls face is the
positive social value a person claims for himself in interaction, a value that
the cointeractants ratify. But what does it mean for a person to cathect his
face?
The noun cathexis, from which the verb to cathect is derived, comes from
James Strachey, the English translator of Freud. In referring to the invest-
ment of libidinal energy to objects, Freud used the term Besetzung. The
original meaning of the German word is something like “casting” or “occu-
pation.”Here, as elsewhere, Strachey chose words of Greek origin instead of,
like Freud, using everyday terms. So Besetzung became cathexis, derived
from the Greek word kἁvyiς, which means holding or retention. Cathexis
became the English language psychoanalytic word for referring to the
investment of mental energy to objects.
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Parsons and Shils ðParsons 1951; Parsons and Shils 1951, pp. 68–69Þ took
up the Freudian idea in their social theory, pointing out that for an actor in a
social system, the other actors ðas well as physical or cultural entitiesÞ can be
“objects of cathexis” ðp. 55Þ. The cathexis of objects brings “energy or
motivation” into the social system ðpp. 59 n. 5, pp. 68–69Þ. Cathectic orien-
tation to a situation is constitutive for the actor’s motivation, alongside cog-
nitive and evaluative orientations ðParsons 1951, e.g., p. 7Þ. So, cathexis as an
idea was present in American sociological theory at the time when Goffman
was writing his essay on face work. However, a shift occurred in Goffman’s
usage of this notion: the aspect of cathexis that he addressed was linked not
to other actors but to the person him- or herself. Here, Goffman appears to
be following the train of thought initiated by Heinz Hartmann.
In a text published in 1950—ﬁve years before Goffman’sOnFaceWork—
Heinz Hartmann, who was a leading proponent of American ego psychol-
ogy, formulated an idea of self-cathexis ðHartmann ½1950 1964Þ. Hartmann
was echoing and elaborating Freud’s ð½1914 1957, p. 75Þ idea of the “original
libidinal cathexis of the ego,” that is, a child’s primary love of herself, from
which the love directed to other people is later given off. Not only other
people or ideas can receive cathexis, but also the person him- or herself can
become cathected. “The opposite of object cathexis is . . . cathexis of one’s
own person, that is, self-cathexis.” While also discussing the conceptual dif-
ference between ego and self in ways that are not directly relevant for this
article, Hartmann proceeds to deﬁne narcissism through the idea of self-
cathexis: “We deﬁne narcissism as the libidinal cathexis . . . of the self”
ðHartmann 1964, p. 127Þ. Hartmann’s idea was soon picked up by the two
perhaps most inﬂuential psychoanalytic theorists of narcissism in the dec-
ades to come, Otto Kernberg and Heinz Kohut, who, in spite of their deep
disagreements ðsee Ornstein 1991Þ, shared the idea of self-cathexis.
So in 1955, whenOnFaceWorkwas published, the term self-cathexiswas
present. Goffman will have been well aware of his choice of words. Substi-
tuting the unspeciﬁc concept of “feelings” to the psychoanalytic idea of
“libido,” he paraphrased his key idea very much the same way as the psy-
choanalyst of the time paraphrased self-cathexis, as he wrote that “what the
person . . . invests his feelings in is an idea about himself” ðGoffman 1967,
p. 43Þ. For Goffman, self-cathexis involves investment of feelings in self.
Kernberg, in his paraphrase of self-cathexis, was to use almost the same
wording in 1975: “I deﬁne normal narcissism as the libidinal investment of
the self” ð1975, p. 315Þ.
If some of the key terms in Goffman’s theory of face and the psychoana-
lytic theory of narcissism are almost the same, what can be said about the key
ideas? In what follows, I compare Goffmanian and psychoanalytic under-
standings of face, narcissism, and self-cathexis in three rounds: ﬁrst, trying to
bring out their deep differences in understanding what psychoanalysts might
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call normal narcissism, second, laying out points of connection by using
clinical case material on narcissistic disorder, and third, discussing the
Goffmanian implications of some more recent ways of thinking about ther-
apy for narcissistic disorders.
Let us, however, start with a data extract derived from ordinary inter-
action. This segment, examined here using conversation analytical meth-
ods ðSidnell 2012Þ, will give us an initial understanding of the phenomenon
to be investigated.
BEING A HEDONISTIC EATER
Two middle-aged sisters, Jaana and Tuula, are having coffee at Tuula’s
house. Earlier during the encounter, they were talking about honey. Right
before the conversation fragment shown in extract 1 ðﬁg. 1Þ, Tuula told her
sister about a friend of hers, a professional in food who adds sugar in many
kinds of dishes, making them taste better. Jaana now, from line 1 onward,
returns to the beneﬁts of honey. The text of the transcript is presented in
paired lines: above, there is the Finnish original, and below, an idiomatic
English translation ðfor transcription symbols, see the appendixÞ.
At the beginning of this fragment, in lines 1–12, the participants reach
agreement on the good qualities of honey. In lines 1 and 2, Jaana starts an
assessment regarding honey, notably heading toward saying that honey
has beneﬁts beyond those of sugar. Jaana’s utterance here is slightly dis-
afﬁliative in relation to Tuula’s earlier appreciative story about the friend
who uses sugar in cooking ðnot shown in the dataÞ. The contrast between
honey and sugar is embodied in the turn-initiating “but” ðline 1Þ and in the
emphasis on “honey” in line 2. An agreement regarding honey is never-
theless achieved, and several rounds of accounts and conﬁrmations ensue.
So, in lines 05, 09, and 12, Tuula completes and elaborates the assessment
of honey, as compared to sugar. Jaana receives the completion and ex-
pansions by agreeing in lines 08, 11, and 13.
Now Jaana, in lines 13 and 14, adds another facet to the assessment:
honey is also healthier. Through her lexical choices and prosody, she,
however, gradually backs down from her assessment during its produc-
tion. She starts by marking the assessment as a subjective one ð“in my
opinion”Þ. Different kinds of qualiﬁcation follow, marking the perspective
as someone else’s ð“it’s . . . supposed to be”Þ and the statement as episte-
mically questionable ð“as if”Þ. Jaana’s voice becomes quieter on the word
“healthier” ðat a point when her gaze reaches Tuula’s gazeÞ; the voice
quality conveys hesitation or uncertainty.
Throughout her utterance, Jaana thus increasingly orients to Tuula’s
anticipated disafﬁliation or disagreement. Even though Tuula does not
indicate her disagreement verbally at this point, her face andposture seem to
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FIG. 1.—Extract 1, Tuula and Jaana
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suggest as much: she looks at Jaana with her chin up, with a neutral face, as
shown in ﬁgure 2A.2 After the point of completion in line 14, a silence
follows. Tuula breaths in and withdraws from her postural orientation
toward Jaana ðlines 15–17; ﬁg. 2BÞ. Jaana smiles, gazing at Tuula ðﬁg. 2BÞ.
In line 18, Jaana adds, as an increment ðSchegloff 1996Þ to her already
completed utterance, another reservation to her assessment, by reexpress-
ing her doubt ðmukamas/supposedlyÞ. Just before the word, she snorts,
withdraws her gaze from Tuula, and then, while talking, tilts her head and
looksatTuula, as itwere, frombelow ðseeﬁg. 2CÞ.This creates the impression
of being apologetic or appealing—but in a light and humorous way.
Up to this point, Tuula’s disafﬁliation has been conveyed only through
nonverbal means ðsee ﬁg. 2AÞ, while Jaana has been orienting herself to it in
her utterance design and nonverbal comportment. In lines 19, 20, 22, and 25,
however, Tuula openly disafﬁliates with Jaana. Rather than producing the
relevant next action ðsecond assessment regarding honeyÞ, Tuula openly
challenges Jaana by claiming her disinterest in health issues. In doing so, she
refutes the relevance of Jaana’s preceding assessment. Through an extreme
case formulation ðPomeranz 1986; en koskaan/never, mitään/anyÞ, she dis-
tances herself from Jaana’s health concerns in lines 19 and 20 and describes
her own appreciation of good taste in contrast ðline 25Þ. Through this Tuula
presents herself as a hedonist rather than as a health-oriented person.
In lines 28, 29, and 32, Jaana offers a parallel account of her cookinghabits,
claiming in essence that her habits are hedonistic also ðusing “real butter” and
honeyÞ. The account of cooking habits becomes competitive, as Tuula points
out that she also, always, uses real butter ðlines 31 and 33Þ.
In his 1955 essay, Goffman deﬁned face as follows: “The term face may be
deﬁned as the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by
the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact. Face is an
image of self delineated in terms of approved social attributes” ð1967, p. 5Þ.
Face is, thus, a positive image of self that a person claims for him- or herself,
an image of self that gets its ratiﬁcation from the person’s interaction part-
ners. In the fragment above, Tuula, and after her Jaana, treat hedonistic
eating as a “positive social value” constituting an “image of self delineated in
terms of approved social attributes.” It is also notable that Tuula withdraws
her support from an image of self that Jaana has implied in her earlier
utterance—the image of herself as a health-conscious person.
Face concerns in this fragment thus reach the surface of interaction.
With her disafﬁliative account of her cooking habits beginning in line 19,
2Alongside Tuula’s nonverbal expression, knowledge shared by the participants, re-
garding their respective views on food and health, may be involved in Jaana’s antici-
pation of disagreement, but the data do not give us access to that. On speakers moni-
toring visual recipient action, see Goodwin ð1980Þ.
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Tuula puts a “face threatening act” on record, without redress ðsee Brown
and Levinson 1987Þ.
THREE COMPARISONS
Social and Internal Self
In this section, I contrast Goffman’s views of self with those of narcissism
held by two leading psychoanalysts. OttoKernberg’s andHeinzKohut’s ﬁrst
writings on narcissism originated in the early 1960s. Despite their divergent
accounts, they remain key theorists on the ﬁeld. I will argue that while both
Goffman and the psychoanalysts are concerned with a person’s ideas, im-
ages, and representations regarding him- or herself, for Goffman, the self is
primarily dependent on situational interaction, while for Kernberg and Ko-
hut, it is anchored in the psychic structure shaped in individual development.
BothKernberg andKohut understand the self as an intrapsychic structure.
For Kernberg, it consists of “multiple self representations and their related
affect dispositions” ð1975, p. 315Þ. These representations reﬂect “the person’s
perception of himself in real interactions with signiﬁcant others and in
fantasied interactions with internal representations of signiﬁcant others”
ðpp. 315–16Þ. The degree to which the self receives libidinal investment
ðresulting in good self-esteem or self-regardÞ is a consequence of biographical
experience and the internal dynamics of the mind—of ego ideals, superego
factors, representations of others, as well as love received from others, grati-
ﬁcations, achievements, and the person’s physical health ðpp. 318–20; see also
Kernberg1991Þ. Inhealthydevelopment, libidinal investment of the self ðself-
cathexisÞ and libidinal investment of others ðobject cathexisÞ are separate but
mutually reinforcing; furthermore, libidinal investments and aggressive in-
vestments are integrated.Thus, biographical experience shapes the self and its
cathexis, but the self so shaped is a structure within the individual.
Kohut, while inmanyways disagreeing with Kernberg, shared with him a
view of the self as “a structure within the mind” ðKohut 1971, p. xv; see also
Ornstein 1991Þ. According toKohut, in healthy infancy the child, in response
to inevitable frustrations, assumes a grandiose image of self ðalongside its
counterpart, the image of an idealized parent objectÞ, in an attempt “to save
the originally all-embracingnarcissismby concentratingperfection andpower
upon the self” ð1971, p. 106Þ. Under favorable developmental circumstances,
the archaic grandiose self of childhood gives way to more mature forms of
narcissism characterized by stable self-esteem regulation ðOrnstein 1991Þ.
Importantly, however, within realistic self-esteem regulation, there remain
“infused” traces of the early grandiose self, fueling the individual’s self-regard
and persistence ðKohut 1971, p. 108Þ. Thus, the grandiose self is not given up
butmodiﬁed and integratedwith the rest of the psychic apparatus involving a
more realistic conception of the self.
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For Kernberg and Kohut alike, the self is then an intrapsychic structure.
Cathexis of the self arises from a lifelong developmental path that is shaped
by the individual’s real interactions with, and internalized images of, her
important fellowmen. While Kernberg and Kohut understand the key chal-
lenges along this path in different ways ðKernberg emphasizing the integra-
tion of aggression and libido,Kohut emphasizing the integration of the archaic
grandiose self and realistic parts of the egoÞ, they still share an overall per-
spective on self-cathexis: while it inevitably involves momentary ﬂuctuations
arising from current experiences with others, it is primarily an outcome of a
lifelong developmental path.
Goffman’s understanding of face shares something with Kernberg’s and
Kohut’s conceptualizations yet is quite different. What Goffman and the
psychoanalysts have in common is a focus on self-representations. Goff-
man refers repeatedly to the “idea” or “image” of self as the core of what he
calls face: “face is an image of self delineated in terms of approved social
attributes” ð1967, p. 5; italics addedÞ, and “what the person protects and
defends and invests his feelings in is an idea about himself ” ðp. 43; italics
addedÞ. We might say that what Goffman is referring to here is similar to
what Kernberg and Kohut refer to when talking about self-representations
and self-images.
However, while for Kernberg and Kohut the images/ideas/representa-
tions/perceptions of self make up an intrapsychic structure, for Goffman
they inhabit the world of interaction out there. Thus, for Goffman, a per-
son’s face “is not lodged in or on his body, but rather something that is
diffusely located in the ﬂow of events in the encounter” ð1967, p. 7Þ: Goff-
man’s “self” is inherently situational and intersubjective, produced and
ratiﬁed ðor not ratiﬁedÞ in social encounters.3
Considering the theoretical background of Goffman’s idea of face and
self-cathexis may help us to see more clearly his original contribution, also
in relation to psychoanalysis. At the time that Goffman published his essay,
the idea of self as being embedded in social interaction was by no means
new. Each in different ways, William James ð1891; see also Leudar and
Thomas 2000, pp. 91–98Þ, George Herbert Mead ð1934; see also Joas 1985,
3Goffman is not ðhere or elsewhereÞ very clear or systematic in his use of concepts. Even
though he offers deﬁnitions for “face” ðsee aboveÞ and “self” ðGoffman 1967, p. 31Þ,
he does not clarify the distinction between the two and actually uses the two concepts
almost interchangeably. We might say that “self” refers to a person’s own experience of
himself and others’ experience of him or her more broadly, while “face” refers to the
evaluative aspect of that experience. Both self and face are inherently embedded in, and
produced by, social interaction. Occasionally, Goffman talks about social face or social
self: analytically, this does not seem to add anything to his concepts of face and self, but
rather, the attribute “social” serves as a reminder of the social origin of face and self.
Here, Goffman’s vocabulary is different from James’s ð1891Þ, as for the latter, the social
self was an aspect of the empirical self distinctly different from its two other aspects ðthe
material self and the spiritual selfÞ.
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pp. 105–20Þ, and Charles Horton Cooley ð1902Þ all pointed out that what
the individual experiences and perceives as himself arises from the way in
which he understands that others, in different social contexts, see him and
recognize him. Especially, James emphasized ðas Goffman was to do more
than 60 years after himÞ, the emotional and evaluative ramiﬁcations of the
social self. A lengthy citation from the Principles of Psychology illustrates
how deeply Goffman is indebted to James.
A man’s social self is the recognition which he gets from his mates. We are
not only gregarious animals, liking to be in sight of our fellows, but we have
an innate propensity to get ourselves noticed, and noticed favorably, by our
kind. Nomore ﬁendish punishment could be devised, were such a thing phys-
ically possible, than that one should be turned loose in society and remain
absolutely unnoticed by all the members thereof. If no one turned round
when we entered, answered when we spoke, but if every person we met ‘cut
us dead’ and acted as if we were non-existing things, a kind of rage and im-
potent despair would ere long well up in us, from which the cruellest bodily
tortures would be a relief; for these would make us feel that, however bad
might be our plight, we had not sunk to such a depth as to be unworthy of
attention at all. ðJames 1891, pp. 293–94Þ
Interestingly, Goffman does not refer to James, or Cooley, or Mead, in his
text on face. While the novelty of Goffman’s work was thus not in showing
the social origins of the self, or in pointing out the immense emotional
ramiﬁcations that recognition from and by others has, it was he who
powerfully illustrated the fragility and precariousness of the social self. The
self, once formed in a social process, is not a stable construct but something
inherently at risk due to nonrecognition or misrecognition. It is a precious
possession that needs constant vigilance; the Goffmanian “individual is
never secure in an encounter” ðRawls 1987, p. 140Þ.
Consider again extract 1. The ubiquitous insecurity of the participants is
embodied not only in the assessment sequences ðﬁrst in lines 1–12 and then
beginning in line 13Þ in which the ﬁrst speaker runs the risk of the other
rejecting her views and not only in the competitive self-descriptions ðlines
19–33Þ but, equally, in the very taking of turns and the production of
utterances, whereby each participant claims being worthy for the other’s
attention ðGoffman 1967, pp. 9–10Þ.
For Goffman, the social constitution of self was not primarily an analyst’s
notion but a “members’ concern” ðon analysts’ and members’ concepts, see
Garﬁnkel 1967Þ: something that persons in interaction incessantly attend to.
Furthermore, the Goffmanian actor is concerned not only about his or her
own face but also about the cointeractant’s face. Embarrassment, resulting
from the discrepancy between the projected acceptable self and what tran-
spires in interaction, is typically shared by those in presence, “in ever wid-
ening circles of discomﬁture” ðGoffman 1956, p. 268Þ. The anxiety for one’s
own and the other’s self penetrates interaction: “By repeatedly and auto-
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matically4 asking himself the question, ‘If I do or do not act in this way, will I
or others lose face?’ he decides at eachmoment, consciously or unconsciously,
how to behave” ðGoffman 1967, p. 36; see also Brown and Levinson 1987,
p. 61Þ.
The momentary fragility of the Goffmanian actor’s self is something that
separates Goffman from the psychoanalytic theorists of narcissism we
have been reviewing. The Kernbergian and Kohutian self as an intra-
psychic structure is something relatively stable: while self-esteem ﬂuctuates
in response to gratiﬁcations, acceptance, and rejections received from others
ðKernberg 2010, pp. 257–58Þ, the self and its cathexis are still shaped in
biographical time. The fragility of the Goffmanian self manifests itself more
radically and in a much shorter time span: in the moment-by-moment time
of social interaction.5
So in the psychoanalytic theories under review here, self-experience is
embedded in psychic structure, while in Goffman, the self is momentary and
situational. However, the momentary Goffmanian self is not without struc-
tural embeddedness—but for Goffman, the relevant structures are interac-
tional. “One ﬁnds evidence to suggest a functional relationship between the
structure of the self and the structure of spoken interaction” ðGoffman 1967,
p. 36Þ. Unpacking this functional relationship,Rawls ð1987, esp., pp. 137–39Þ
suggests that the ultimate dependency of the self on social interaction places
a fundamental constraint on social interaction, resulting in the indepen-
dency of interaction as an ordered domain of action, separate from larger
institutional structures ðsee also Goffman 1983Þ. Thus, for Goffman, the ex-
istential dependency of the self on social interaction produces a two-way
relation, where the self organizes social interaction, and social interaction
organizes the self.
Brown and Levinson’s ð1987, pp. 65–68Þ theoretical work on politeness
unpacks this further, suggesting that a multitude of conversational actions—
including, among many others, orders, requests, suggestions, advice, re-
minders, compliments, criticism, disagreements ðfor a disagreement, see
extract 1 aboveÞ, news deliveries—involvewhatBrownandLevinson call an
intrinsic face threat to the recipient or the speaker. In performing these ac-
4The word “automatically” that Goffman uses here raises a question about the con-
sciousness attached to the considerations of face. In terms of Freud’s ð½1915 1957Þ to-
pographic theory, they seem to be preconscious: unconscious in a descriptive sense but
readily retrievable to consciousness, as they are not subject to repression.
5Within the psychoanalytic tradition, it is Erik Erikson who has come closest to a
Goffmanian understanding of the momentary fragility of self. While Erikson is usually
not regarded as a theorist of narcissism, in his discussion of ego identity, he formulates
the process of “communication on the ego level” in terms that come close to Goffmanian
concerns about the dependency of self on social interaction. In such communication,
“each ego tests all the information received sensorily and sensually, linguistically and
subliminally for the conﬁrmation or negation of its identity” ðErikson 1968, p. 220Þ.
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tions ðandmany othersÞ, social actors have to consider the images of self that
their actions project for the actor and for the recipients. Conversation ana-
lytic studies have elaborated some of these practices further, showing how
participants are oriented to concerns of face in choosing topics ðMaynard and
Zimmerman 1984Þ, in displaying their knowledgeability in assessments
ðHeritage and Raymond 2005; for face-related epistemic work in an assess-
ment, see also lines 13, 14, and 18 in extract 1, ﬁg. 1Þ, and in anticipatory
completion of an utterance initiated by a cointeractant ðLerner 1996Þ. There
is no reason to think that the studies thus far have exhausted the interactional
practices and structures that are functionally related to concerns of face.
The notion of self-cathexis is a link between Goffman and psychoana-
lytic theorists of narcissism. But their understandings of the ways in which
self-cathexis is molded are different. The differences are encapsulated in
ﬁgure 3. For Otto Kernberg and Heinz Kohut the organization of cathexis
of the self arises from individual development, which is shaped by early
object relations as well as by the internal dynamics of the person. Nur-
turing or traumatizing interactions between a developing person and his or
her most important others facilitate or fail to facilitate the development of
normal narcissism. In adulthood, when the individual is equipped with
mature structures of self and self-cathexis, the ups and downs of interac-
tional relations with others result in phasic ﬂuctuations of self-esteem.
Goffman’s view of the dependence of self on interaction is different. For
him, cathexis of the self arises from real time social encounters: face, or a
person’s image of self, emerges from encounters, and it is ratiﬁed, or fails
FIG. 3.—Key differences in the notion of self-cathexis in Goffman and in two psy-
choanalytic theorists
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to be ratiﬁed, by copresent others. The maintenance of face is a reciprocal
process—my face is dependent on yours, and I work to maintain your face
as well as my own. Rather than being embedded in psychic structure, the
Goffmanian self is embedded in the organization of social interaction.
Therefore, Goffman can depict the social basis of cathexis of the self in this,
we might say, sober way: “while ½a person’s social face can be his most
personal possession and the centre of his security and pleasure, it is only a
loan to him from society” ð1967, p. 10Þ.
Thus, in both Goffmanian theory and in psychoanalysis ðKernberg and
KohutÞ, social interaction is involved in self-cathexis. The key difference
concerns the temporality of the relevant interaction—whether it is seen in
biographical time ðas in psychoanalysisÞ or in the moment-by-moment
time of a single encounter ðas in GoffmanÞ. In both views, the self and its
cathexis are embedded in structures that have persistence over time. For
Goffman, such structures involve the organization of social interaction,
while for psychoanalysts, the relevant structures concern the enduring
organization of mind.
In the next sections, I discuss a possible rapprochement between these
views; such a rapprochement could lead to fruitful expansions and revi-
sions in both views. Narcissistic personality disorder provides the empir-
ical context for this discussion.
Face and Pathological Narcissism
So far, I have been speaking about “ordinary” narcissistic phenomena: the
cathexis of self that typically developed individuals have. Now, I turn to
individuals whose cathexis of self is somehowdifferent. Through considering
what in psychiatry is called pathological narcissism ðe.g., Pincus and Roche
2011Þ or, in a more narrow and diagnostic sense, narcissistic personality
disorder ðRonningstam 2012; APA 2013Þ, I will add a new layer to the
comparison between Goffman and psychoanalytic theories of narcissism.
Psychotherapeutic and psychiatric texts depict the key features of
pathological narcissism and narcissistic personality disorder in rather
consistent ways. The clinical picture involves a grandiose image of self
and, paradoxically, an endless need to receive acceptance and love ðKohut
1971; Kernberg 1975; APA 2013Þ. There are thus two facets in pathological
narcissism: grandiosity ðalso referred to as overt, oblivious, or thick-skinned
narcissismÞ and vulnerability ðcovert, hypervigilant, or thin-skinned nar-
cissism; Rosenfeld 1987; Akhtar 1989; Gabbard 1989; Wink 1991; Pincus
and Roche 2011Þ. Importantly, the same persons often oscillate between
grandiose and vulnerable self-states ðe.g., Pincus and Roche 2011Þ. Even
though the image of self is at the heart of pathological narcissism, it also has
implications for a person’s relations to others: persons with narcissistic
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difﬁculties have a tendency to idealize some people, trying to identify with
them,while they disparage others “fromwhom they do not expect anything”
ðKernberg 1975, p. 228Þ. Furthermore, pathological narcissism can be
characterized by a lack of empathy ðAPA 2013Þ.
In their dependence on approval and attention ðKohut 1971, p. 17Þ and
in their great need to be loved and admired ðKernberg 1975, p. 227Þ,
persons with narcissistic disorder appear, at ﬁrst sight, to be strikingly
Goffmanian actors. A Goffmanian actor’s image of self is utterly depen-
dent on the recognition given by others. So, does the Goffmanian actor
suffer what psychiatrists might call a narcissistic personality disorder?6 In
what follows, I argue differently, suggesting that narcissistic personality
disorder is a meaningful concept, as a description of a speciﬁc atypical way
of relating to oneself, also in the light of Goffman’s theory of face. I present
my suggestions with the help of case material from my psychotherapeutic
practice. In the light of this clinical material, I also suggest some modiﬁ-
cations to the Goffmanian concept of face.
The signiﬁcance of psychoanalytic case notes as data for social research is
debatable. Psychoanalytic sessions constitute a particular kind of qualita-
tive interview ðKvale 1999, 2003Þ, one inwhich formal constraints directing
interviewee talk are minimized and in which the interviewee’s under-
standings change over time. The psychoanalytic interview is meant to ac-
commodate topics that are painful and emotional and to bring forward the
patient’s tacit, presuppositional knowledge about self and others ðcf. Stern
et al. 1998Þ. However, psychoanalytic interviews and case notes based on
them lack the systematicity, not to mention the replicability, usually asso-
ciated with scientiﬁc observation. In the analysts’ way of conducting the
interview, the agenda of helping and the agenda of generating knowledge are
inevitably intertwined. But in dealing with a topic like the current one, hy-
pothetical knowledge as generated in the psychoanalytic interview is rele-
vant: psychoanalysis is a setting where the patient’s images of self, and the
diffuse emotions associated with them, are addressed and clariﬁed.
Pietari, or “Peter,” was a man in his late twenties when he started psy-
choanalysis. To protect his anonymity, some details of his story have been
changed, although the psychological picture is preserved. Peter saw me
four times a week for several years. His presenting problem involved
sadness, anxiety, and lack of motivation. My notes below come from the
ﬁrst two years of treatment, when problems with his image of self mani-
fested themselves most clearly. In his narratives, he repeatedly went back
to events 15 years before: something went wrong when he and his family
6Should this be the case, then we might think, as Lasch ð1979Þ seemed to propose 35 year
ago, that narcissistic personality disorder has become an epidemic in society or, as the
critics of medicalization such as Frances ð2013Þ propose, that psychiatric diagnoses
such as narcissism involve the pathologization of inherently normal human fragility.
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moved to another city when he was around 14. Since then, he had felt
weak, an outsider, shy, and worthless.
In what follows, I present some unedited but translated fragments from
my clinical notes during the ﬁrst two years of analysis. The letters CN
followed by a number refer to the corresponding page in my clinical notes.
Peter repeatedly depicts himself as feeling weak in social interactions. He
tells me that after the family moved and he had to go to a new school, he
suddenly started to feel that he was worth nothing. He became thoroughly
embarrassed ðCN 18Þ. He tells me about sitting in a bar with a group of
others the night before: “worried beforehand that shyness and timidity will
hitme again—that’s what happened—the others conversed in a spontaneous
way, Iwas not able to say anything—feeling that now they see that in reality I
am this weakling, being active during lessons has been just showing off
ðdescribes his feeling: unbearable anxietyÞ—closing ritual: I could not par-
ticipate, I withdrew as if I was sending a text message” ðCN 137Þ. In de-
scribing another event, he tells me: “Then I tried to talk with people—it
was really difﬁcult—had the feeling that I am in no way interesting—I have
no right to talk to them” ðCN 140Þ. In describing his interactions with an
older colleague, he says: “Occasionally I feel that Timo appreciates me—but
then again that he treats me as a little child—doesn’t take me seriously when
talking about male business” ðCN 141Þ.
Peter is anxious about not being liked and longs for acceptance. “In con-
versations, it is as if I were walking on a tightrope. I am afraid that I will not
be liked” ðCN 13Þ. “I have an endless need to be admired and attended to”
ðCN 151Þ.
Repeatedly, Peter gets immersed in daydreams of extraordinary success.
The strongest dream is to become a famous computer game designer: “this
morning: now I have to start ðcreating storyboards and sketchesÞ—now
the dream is stronger than ever—fantasies about recording sessions and
launching events—producing the game with Esa’s team—what might they
think if they knew” ðCN 130Þ.
His feelings and thoughts alternate between full immersion in this
dream, and doubts and rejection of it, and recognition of the dream as one
that arises from his unsatisﬁed need for acceptance. At a moment of im-
mersion, he can tell me: “watching ða segment of a game that he madeÞ—
almost passing out—hands becoming numb—so powerful—made by me”
ðCN 132Þ. And again on a another day: “the computer-game dream: crazy
with happiness” ðCN97Þ. In one session, however, he tells me how he showed
his sketches to a friend and became worried that the friend might not like the
recordings: “whether my enthusiasm in computer-game design was a eu-
phoria and an ego-trip” ðCN 131Þ. The immersion into the dream can give
way to complete rejection of it: “shyness and blushing—I hate myself. Could
kill myself, have no right to live. The dream of being a computer-game
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designer: as I am like this, I realize that I haveno rights to that” ðCN127Þ. In a
session some days later he is still in doubt: “are these dreams of being a game
designer in vain” ðCN 127Þ. In some moments, he considers his dream as
something that arises from his unsatisﬁed needs: “I have an endless need to
receive admiration and attention—the dream of becoming a computer-game
designer is part of that” ðCN 151Þ.
Goffman’s ð1967, p. 8Þ description of a person being “out of face” cap-
tures many of the experiences that Peter relates to me ðsee also Goffman
1956Þ. In such a situation, an encounter with others does not sustain the
image of self that the person wants to present and is emotionally attached
to. “A person may be said to be out of face when he participates in a contact
with others without having ready a line of the kind participants in such
situations are expected to take” ðGoffman 1967, p. 8Þ. Such a person, ac-
cording to Goffman, is “likely to feel ashamed and inferior because of what
has happened to the activity on his account and because of what may hap-
pen to his reputation as a participant.” Such an experience will “momentarily
incapacitate him as an interactant” ðp. 8Þ.
While Goffman describes the momentary painful experience of being out
of face and embarrassed, for Peter, being out of face seems to be an endur-
ing state. He feels that he is enduringly incapacitated as an interactant. He
seems to be unable to assume approved social attributes. Instead of a pos-
itive self-cathexis, his feelings and thoughts are attached to this inability—
causing persistent emotional pain. Furthermore, it seems that Peter seeks to
cure his damaged face through solitary fantasies of extraordinary success.
What is it that does not work?
If we are to believe Goffman’s idea of self, Peter is as much dependent on
recognition by others as everyone else. The only social face that he could
ever have would be “a loan to him from society” ðGoffman 1967, p. 10Þ.
The encounters that Peter describes in his narratives seem to me, in them-
selves, not essentially different from what one would expect in an ordinary
social encounter. It appears that Peter is not suffering from what Goffman
ð1963Þ and many others call stigma: his difﬁculties do not arise from a pub-
licly observable discrediting attribute, leading to rejection by others. Yet
Peter remains with the experience that he is out of face, feeling ashamed
and inferior. The problem seems to lie in his inability to receive recognition
from others.
In sum, this might be a Goffmanian reading of Peter’s problem: he is
unable to enter into reciprocal face work, which is the only way available
for us to acquire a social face. The problem may have to do with the
vulnerability and insecurity ðRawls 1987Þ that face work brings with it:
with face work, you basically have to accept that your image of self is in the
hands of others—just as others’ self-images are in your hands. As this kind
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of mutual dependence is for some reason unavailable to Peter, what he is
left with, instead, are solitary fantasies of strength and independence.
Occasionally in my conversations with Peter, his inability to receive
recognition of his projected self is topicalized. In one session, he tells me
about classes that he takes at university: “a 65-year-old teacher—likes me—
asks me questions—‘as you have opinions’—feeling that he wants to please
me, I have manipulated him to like me” ðCN 115Þ. In another session, I
ask him about the ways in which ordinary social encounters might or might
not give him what he longs for in his daydreams: this is how I describe the
exchange in my notes ðmy utterance is marked with angle bracketsÞ: “I
have an endless need to receive admiration and attention—the dream of
becoming a computer-game designer is part of that— . . . <is this need in
such a way bottomless that the attention and admiration that can be re-
ceived in ordinary situations is not at all enough, but leaves you empty?>—
It’s rather so that I am not able to get attention and admiration in ordinary
situations” ðCN 151Þ.
There seem to be two facets in Peter’s inability to engage in reciprocal face
work. On the one hand, the self that he dreams about ðmost saliently, being
the center of admiration and attention as a computer game designerÞ is
something that copresent others cannot recognize—they do not even know
about this dream, let alone share it as common ground. He is left alone and
unrecognized with his fantasy. On the other hand, Peter cannot make use
of, or even believe in, the recognition that others do offer—for example, in
Peter’s eyes, the teacher’s way of acknowledging his opinions is not genuine
but based on his having manipulated the teacher. So Peter does not get from
others what he longs for, and what he does get, he is not able to make use of.
Now let us recall howKohut ð1971Þ describes the development of mature
narcissism: the infant’s grandiose self-image becomes modiﬁed and inte-
grated into the rest of the psychic apparatuswith amore realistic conception
of the self. In narcissistic disorders, such gradual integration does not take
place, but instead, the grandiose fantasies remain, isolated and dissociated
from “the reality ego” or “the rest of the psychic apparatus” ðKohut 1971,
p. 144Þ. TheGoffmanian reading of Peter’s problems reveals the social facet
of this lack of integration. Peter’s inability to receive and make use of rec-
ognition from others involves a split, or communicative barrier, between
his self-image and the public interactional work that maintains the social
self. Thus,while forKohut, the reality fromwhich the narcissistic self-image
is detached involves a psychic structure ð“the reality ego”Þ, in a Goffmanian
reading, it involves the interactional production of the social self in en-
counters. Peter’s self-image is dissociated from the practices and structures
of face work. There is no reason to think that these conceptualizations of
the isolation of a narcissistic self-image are mutually exclusive: the isolation
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of a self-image from a “reality ego” may entail its isolation from face-work
practices.
I would like to propose that the story of Peter’s treatment shows that
Goffman’s idea of face and face work is relevant for understanding nar-
cissistic disorders. However, the clinical material also suggests a need for
revision or expansion of the concept of face. There are two such issues;
both involve the Goffmanian view accommodating some of the perspec-
tives that we ascribed to psychoanalytic views in the preceding section.
First is the historicity of face and face work. For Goffman, face is ﬁrst
and foremost situational. Being out of face, and therefore incapacitated as
an interactant, is a momentary experience. Peter’s narratives, however,
suggest that face has transsituational and autobiographical aspects. En-
counters where he felt out of face live in his memory, for years and decades.
This suggests that the copresence of encounters has its historicity. It may
be that unsuccessful face work remains in our autobiographical memory
more than does successful face work.
The second revision that the clinical material suggests for Goffmanian
theory involves something that might be called the psychological compe-
tence required by face work. Although Goffman occasionally refers to per-
sonality differences in people’s inclination to experience the vulnerability of
their face ð1956, pp. 267–68Þ, his main line of argumentation is that prob-
lems of face are to be understood in terms of momentary interaction rather
than personal maladjustment ðpp. 269–70Þ. The psychological view and the
interactional view need not be unrelated, however. As Goffman ð1967, p. 3Þ
himself emphasized, “psychology is necessarily involved” in the study of
interaction, and in light of the difﬁculties in face work of persons with
narcissistic problems ðlike PeterÞ, it appears that this psychology can and
should be elaborated.
Individuals seem to need a certain psychological competence in order to
beneﬁt from face work, to be able to receive the recognition of their self that
others in interaction can offer them. Peter appears to lack these features. In
a most general sense, we are talking about emotional and cognitive dis-
positions: the ways in which a person, in the copresence of others in a social
encounter, is able to recognize and appraise features and properties in herself
and in others that embodyworthiness of the self. The full explication of these
competencieswould require themerging of perspectives from self psychology
and interactional sociology and is beyond the scope of this article. Below,
however, some directions for future research will be suggested.
In the next section of the article, I ﬁrst revisit the ideas of Donald Win-
nicott, a British pediatrician and psychoanalyst of the object relations school,
whose proposals resonate strongly with the tenor of Goffman’s theory. Then
I discuss the more recent development of Winnicottian concepts, suggesting
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that playfulness may be one aspect of the psychological competence required
for successful face work.
Origins\Restoration of Psychological Competence for Face Work
In nontechnical language, Winnicott ð1971Þ helps us see the origins of the
psychological competence for face work. Winnicott, like Goffman, talks
about face but, in a concrete sense, about themother’s ðand the other’sÞ face.
For him, the mother’s face is a mirror in which the baby or the infant ﬁrst
recognizes itself. To put this in Goffmanian terms, Winnicott seems to be
suggesting that this is the ontogenetic origin of face and face work: where
the infant ﬁrst establishes herself. Just as in Goffman ðand in James, Mead,
and CooleyÞ, so also in Winnicott, the self emerges only when the other, in
interaction, recognizes it ðfor a recent reworking of these ideas, see also
Honneth ½2008Þ.Thus, Winnicott was able to say that the mother and the
family are “giving back to the baby the baby’s own self” ð1971, p. 6Þ. If
difﬁculties arise in this—and sometimes they do—the individual’s experi-
ence of self will be problematic. InGoffmanian terms, wewould say that the
psychic competence necessary for beneﬁting from face work in later life
might not develop under these circumstances.
Winnicott considers psychotherapeutic processes that can be helpful, as a
parallel to the original faceworkbetween infant andmother. Psychotherapy
involves “a long-term giving the patient back what the patient brings. It is a
complex derivative of the face that reﬂects what is there to be seen”
ðWinnicott 1971, p. 5Þ. If the therapy goes well, “the patient will ﬁnd his or
her own self, and will be able to exist and to feel real” ðp. 5Þ. In Goffman-
ian terms, we might then say that psychotherapy involves a speciﬁc insti-
tutionally ascribed variant of face work. Recent conversation-analytic
research has started to specify the interactional practices throughwhich this
work takes place ðPeräkylä et al. 2008Þ. Below, I elaborate on some aspects
of this work through theoretical discussion, thereby elucidating further the
psychological competence required for face work.
Let us return to Peter’s fantasy of becoming a famous computer game
designer—the fantasy that is, at times, the center of his inner life. How
should a therapist relate to such an image of self? For Kernberg ð1975Þ,
such grandiosity is a result of pathological development. In psychotherapy,
it is the task of the therapist to confront the patient with it, so as to show
him or her how the fantasy serves as a defense.
On the basis of ideas from Kohut and Winnicott, Stephen Mitchell
ð½1986 1999Þ—a leading proponent of the relational school of American
psychoanalysis ðsee Mitchell 2000Þ—has formulated a rather different
view. In his view, there is no fundamental difference between “normal”
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and “pathological” narcissism. As Kohut ð1971Þ already pointed out, gran-
diosity, as well as idealization, are necessary illusions in childhood. Gran-
diosity and idealization in adulthood are, essentially, a continuation ofwhat
we see in children: “the core of the self and the deepest source of creativity”
ðMitchell 1999, p. 161Þ. However, there are more or less benign, more or
less beneﬁcial forms of narcissism. For Mitchell, the subject’s relation to his
or her illusions is the key question: whether one can playfully maintain them
ðand give them upÞ or whether one is claiming a status of reality for them.
Seen from this perspective, Peter’s problem is not his self-image as a
famous computer game designer in the future but the way in which he
rigidly sticks to this illusion, alternating between the feeling that this really
is his purpose in life and the feeling of defeat when he suspects that it is not
going to work. This rigidness may be a psychological counterpart of the
dissociation between his fantasied self-image and the social processes of
real interactional face work.
Importantly, for Mitchell, a narcissistic illusion is a way of relating to
others. Maintenance of a narcissistic illusion can be a joint activity. “An
ability to play together, including a participation in each other’s illusions,
is a crucial dimension not only of adult-child relationships, but of adult-
adult relations as well” ðMitchell 1999, p. 170Þ. It appears that this capacity
for participatory play is hampered in narcissistic problems.
Empirical infant research elucidates the developmental basis of playful
participation in illusions. Pretend play—emerging around the second
birthday—is where the playful social self probably ﬁrst comes about ðsee,
e.g., Bergen 2002Þ. Joint pretend play involves fantasized identities—“I am
drinking from this cup,” “I am the shopkeeper”—that others are invited to
take part in ðTomasello 2008, p. 152Þ. Elaborating the developmental path
further, Fonagy and his coworkers ðFonagy and Target 2000; Fonagy et al.
2002, pp. 253–90Þ suggest that a very young child has two distinctively
differentmodes of representing internal states: the psychic equivalentmode,
according to which what is in the mind is also in the outer world, and the
pretend mode, according to which the internal reality and the outer reality
are unconnected. While a very young child maintains a strong distinction
between these modes, in the fourth or ﬁfth year the normally developing
child becomes able to integrate them in a “mentalizing mode of psychic
reality” ðp. 263Þ. The child becomes able to “‘know about’ his idea or wish,
alongside experiencing it” ðp. 266Þ, and to play with reality ðp. 267Þ. Even
with adults, however, the mentalizing capacity can be more or less present
in any particular moment ðp. 268Þ. It appears that when there, the mental-
izing capacity makes possible the benign, playful maintenance of narcis-
sistic illusions.
In sum, Iwould like to suggest that the capacity for playful participation in
one’s own and others’ illusions, embedded in a more general mentalizing
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capacity, is one part of the psychological competence for face work. Having
said this, we should now return toGoffman, askingwhether there is room for
play and illusion in his theory. The acknowledgment of the importance of
play and illusion indeed invites some conceptual and empirical elaboration
of Goffman’s concepts of face and face work.
Let us start from the conceptual end. In his 1955 essay, Goffman treats
face as a sacred object in the Durkheimian sense. The Durkheimian sacred
ðDurkheim ½1912 2001Þ is something unconditional and serious. Face,
understood as a person’s “most personal possession and the centre of his
security and pleasure” ðGoffman 1967, p. 10Þ, is not playful. The picture,
however, becomes more varied in Goffman’s later work. In “Frame Anal-
ysis” ðGoffman 1974, esp., pp. 48–52Þ and “ResponseCries” ðGoffman 1978Þ
he discusses playfulness extensively, although he does not directly address
questions of self ðbut rather the transformation of frames of actionÞ. A
person’s relations to his or her self-image becomes a topic in 1961 as Goff-
man introduces the concept of role distance and its sister concept role
embracement ðsee alsoGoffman 1974, pp. 269ff.Þ. Role embracementmeans
for the person “to disappear completely to the virtual self available in the
situation, to be fully seen in terms of the image, and to conﬁrm expressively
one’s acceptance of it” ðGoffman 1961, p. 102Þ. In role embracement, we are,
fully and seriously, our situational selves. Role distance, however, involves
that “the individual is actually not denying the role but the virtual self that
is implied in the role for all accepting performers” ðp. 103Þ. In role distance,
we know, and indicate to others, that the situational self is not really what
we are. It is of course self-evident that there is a ﬁne gradation between full
role embracement and full role distance.
Now, we might ask whether Goffman’s and Mitchell’s perspectives can
meet through the concept of role distance. Would role distance, as a cog-
nitive, emotional, and expressive practice, involve a way for the individual
to orient to his or her social self in interaction as an illusion, as part of a
Winnicottian playing? The answer may not reside in the exegesis of Goff-
man, Mitchell, or Winnicott but in observations from interactional prac-
tice. Therefore, I would like to return to our starting point, the two sisters
Tuula and Jaana in extract 1 ðsee ﬁg. 1Þ. We will examine their conduct
in enacting their social selves, looking for possible indications of playful
stance-taking.
Tuula’s challenging response ðin lines 19–22 and 25Þ to Jaana’s assess-
ment is where questions about the image of self become explicit. Tuula makes
a blunt assertion about her own preferences, with a voice and face that are
affectively neutral. Her “extreme case” ðPomerantz 1986Þ lexical choices
ðlines 19 and 20: “never,” “any”Þ as well as her high head position convey
determination. In consequence, it is difﬁcult to see any role distancing or
playfulness of the self-image here.
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In her next turn in lines 28, 29, and 32, Jaana seems to orient to Tuula’s
prior utterance as serious. Through a description of her own cooking hab-
its, marked as contrastive to what Tuula has just conveyed, Jaana por-
trays her hedonistic self. So, as far as the observable interaction goes, both
Tuula and Jaana make an effort “to be fully seen in terms of the image”
that the momentary interaction projects in their utterances in lines 19–33.
The situation, however, is different during Jaana’s assessment regarding
the healthiness of honey in lines 13–18. Here she displays role distance,
apparently as a way to deal with the anticipated disafﬁliation of her inter-
locutor. This happens very concretely, by her moving from ﬁrst-person
perspective ð“in my opinion”; line 13Þ to epistemically downgraded third-
person perspective ðsupposedly/muka olevinaanÞ in lines 14 and 18. Impor-
tantly, her face and posture convey playful apology and appeal ðsee ﬁgs. 2B
and 2CÞ.
So, it appears that Jaana, in lines 13–18, in anticipation of the co-
interactant withdrawing support of her claimed self-image, backs away
from that virtual self in a playful way. However, when she then assumes a
different self ðlines 28, 29, and 32Þ, she does so seriously, without any rec-
ognizable role distance or playfulness.
Much more observation of interactional practice would be needed, but
on the basis of the little that we have seen, it does appear that a person’s
position vis-à-vis his or her social self can be observed in interaction. Play-
fulness or seriousness of thatpositioningcanbemanifest inovert expression in
multimodal ways.7 The data that we have at hand also suggest that play-
fulness and seriousness, or their differing degrees, can change moment by
moment, even within a single utterance ðcf. Levinson 1988Þ.
This would indeed make sense in the context of psychotherapy. It sug-
gests that patients can and do change their positions regarding their nar-
cissistic illusions, in one moment being more playful and in another being
more serious. One of the tasks of the therapist would then be to facilitate
and nurture the playful moments, as well as the movement between the
serious and the playful. In doing so, the therapist would be cultivating a
practice, the home base of which is in everyday interaction.
CONCLUSION
In this article, I have discussed and elaborated conceptual linkages be-
tween Goffman’s theory of face and psychoanalytical discussions of normal
7It should be pointed out that a playful stance toward the projected self, and role
distancing, are not equivalent: as Goffman’s essay ð1961Þ implies, role distance can be
serious, when the actor indicates that he or she genuinely disavows the virtual self that
her behavior implies.
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and pathological narcissism. With the help of psychoanalytic discussions on
narcissism, I have reworked what Goffman ð1967Þ referred to as the psy-
chology that is necessarily involved in the study of interaction. My psy-
chology was perhaps not “stripped and cramped” ðGoffman 1967, p. 3Þ like
what Goffman intended his psychology to be: my argument has been that
the engagement with more elaborate psychology discussed here can enrich
the study of interaction. The argumentation has beenmainly theoretical but
enhanced by the analysis of fragments of conversational and clinical data.
The theoretical contribution made in the article is threefold. First, I
pointed out that there is a link between Goffman’s theory of face work and
the classical psychoanalytic conceptualizations of narcissism. The link is
terminological—both speak about cathexis of self—but also conceptual, as
in both strands of thinking, the self is seen as emotionally charged. How-
ever, the emergence of the cathexis of the self is seen in different ways:
Goffman foregrounding the situational experience, momentary fragility,
and anchoring in the structure of interaction, and the psychoanalytic
theorists foregrounding biographical experience, durability, and anchoring
in the psychic structure.
Second, I suggested that while Goffman’s theory of face work is largely
indifferent regarding individual differences, let alone individual patholo-
gies, the theory can, if modiﬁed, offer conceptual resources for under-
standing pathological narcissism. Elaborating on a clinical vignette, as
well as Kohut’s key formulations, I suggested that in pathological nar-
cissism, there is a dissociation between a person’s self-image and the
interactional practices of face work. While in persons with normal nar-
cissism, the self-images arise from, and are offered for, acknowledgment in
the interactional process of face work, in pathological narcissism, they are
split away from that. This split or dissociation amounts to an inability to
receive and make use of recognition from copresent others and results in
grandiose and vulnerable self-states. Observations on pathological nar-
cissism, however, call for a revision in Goffman’s theory: I suggested that
there is a cross-situational continuity in face work, and there are speciﬁc
psychological competencies, not equally shared between all individuals,
that successful face work builds on.
Third, I suggested that playfulness in relation to self-images is one key
part of the psychic competence required for successful face work. Such
playfulness is an aspect of what in more recent developmental psycho-
logical research has been called mentalizing, and it has its ontogenic origins
that have been explored in recent research. While Goffman’s notion of role
distance may be useful in tracing practices of playfulness in social inter-
action and face work, it is empirical work with conversational materials
that is primarily needed for enhancing our understanding regarding ways
in which persons can variate their momentary relation to the selves that
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they assume, and offer for social acknowledgment, in social interaction. On
the basis of conversation analysis of a fragment of speech, I suggested that
all modalities of expression can be involved.
In the article that became his intellectual testament, Goffman ð1983,
p. 3Þ pointed out that there is an “inevitable psychobiological element” in
the interaction order. Undoubtedly, Goffman would have included the
emotions attached to face in this inevitable psychobiology. This article took
up the psychoanalytic and psychiatric theories of narcissism to elaborate on
that aspect of psychobiology of the interaction order. While doing so, the
article pointed out actual and potential linkages between the Goffmanian
and the psychoanalytic traditions.
It is not self-evident that showing linkages between two or more tradi-
tions is useful for furthering knowledge. It does not add much to our knowl-
edge to demonstrate that what is called, say, A in one tradition might quite
well be called B if we take another tradition as our point of departure.
Things can indeed be labeled with different names. However, the dem-
onstration of linkages between different traditions may be genuinely useful
if it leads to an enrichment of the concepts and ideas of the tradition in
question: if the linking of traditions leads to a new understanding of what is
called A in one tradition and B in another.
I would like to suggest that we have indeed gained a new understanding
regarding what Goffman calls face and what psychoanalysts call narcis-
sism. In relation to the psychoanalytic tradition, we can suggest at least the
following items: ð1Þ Even if the self and its cathexis involve intrapsychic
structures, it is in the context of situated social interaction that they are
manifested and modiﬁed. ð2Þ Even with typically developed healthy indi-
viduals, self-cathexis is inherently fragile. Rather than a stable self-image,
healthy narcissism involves tolerating inevitable moments of insecurity for
the self in interaction. ð3Þ The grandiose self-image of persons with narcis-
sistic problems is dissociated not only from the more reality-oriented areas
of the mind but also from the interactional processes of self-maintenance.
ð4Þ A person’s relation to his or her narcissistic illusions is manifested and
displayed in his or her interactions with others and, in healthy interactants, is
subject to moment-by-moment change.
In relation to the Goffmanian concept of face, we can suggest the fol-
lowing items: ð1Þ Being able to maintain a satisfactory social face in inter-
action presupposes psychological competences that not all persons share.
ð2Þ The interactional maintenance of the self and its cathexis has a trans-
situational dimension: what is achieved or perhaps especially what is not
achieved in face work remains in autobiographical memory and tends to be
repeated. ð3ÞFace-work practices, as well as the psychological competences
they are based on, have their ontogenic origins in infant-caretaker inter-
action and in joint pretend play. ð4Þ Social selves and faces in interaction
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can involve different degrees of playfulness and illusion, displayed on a
moment-by-moment basis by the participants.
As these suggestions arise from considerations that are mostly theoret-
ical, they are hypothetical and should be subjected to empirical validation.
Typically developed subjects as well as subjects with diagnosed narcis-
sistic personality disorders should be involved in such research. Obser-
vational methods of the study of interaction should be combined with
methods geared to tracing the self-experience of the participants in inter-
action. In tracing these self-experiences, both momentary and autobio-
graphical timescales should be included.
APPENDIX
TABLE A1
Conversation Analytical Transcription Symbols
Representation Description
°word° Segment quieter than the surrounding talk
#word# Creaky voice
word Emphasis
wo[rd wo]rd Onset and end of overlapping talk
[word ]
@word@ Animated voice
£word£ Smiley voice
wo:rd Stretched sound
hhh Outbreath (length indicated by the number of h’s)
.hhh Inbreath (length indicated by the number of h’s)
w(h)ord Laugh particle inserted in the talk
word. Falling intonation at the end of a segment of talk
word? Rising intonation at the end of a segment of talk
word, Level intonation at the end of a segment of talk
>word< Speech faster than the surrounding talk
↓word Fall in pitch
(0.4) Silence (in seconds)
(.) Micropause (shorter than 20 milliseconds)
NOTE.—For more on CA symbols, see Atkinson and Heritage (1984)
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